Bank Robbery in the Bizarro World by Barnes, Kimberly
The University of the Pacific Law Review
Volume 49 | Issue 2 Article 12
1-1-2018
Bank Robbery in the Bizarro World
Kimberly Barnes
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview
Part of the Legislation Commons
This Legislative Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in The University of the Pacific Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation




Bank Robbery in the Bizarro World1 
Kimberly Barnes* 
Code Section Affected 
Code of Civil Procedure §1281.2 (amended). 
SB 33 (Dodd); 2017 STAT. Ch. 480. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 378 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND .................................................................................. 379 
 A.  The Federal Arbitration Act .................................................................. 381 
  1.  Supreme Court Broadens the FAA’s Scope .................................... 381 
  2.  Modern FAA ................................................................................... 384 
  3.  Preemption ...................................................................................... 384 
 B.  Practical Impacts and California’s Arbitration Law ............................ 386 
  1.  Wells Fargo Cashes in its Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card ................... 387 
  2.  Nonjudicial Attempts at Narrowing the FAA .................................. 387 
  3.  California’s Arbitration Act ............................................................ 388 
III. CHAPTER 480 ............................................................................................... 389 
IV. ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................... 389 
 A.  The Problems with Forcing Arbitration ................................................ 390 
  1.  Mass Deprivation of Rights ............................................................ 390 
  2.  Arbitration Favors the Corporation ............................................... 391 
 B.  Preemption ............................................................................................ 394 
  1.  Chapter 480 Does Not Apply to Contracts Generally .................... 395 
  2.  Chapter 480 Limits the Validity of Arbitration Clauses ................. 396 
  3.  Chapter 480 May Go Against the FAA’s Objectives ...................... 397 
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 399 
 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2019; B.A., 
Philosophy: Ethics, Politics & Law, California State University, Sacramento, 2016.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Greed pushed Wells Fargo bank employees to open over two million bank 
accounts without customer knowledge or consent.2 Employees, fearing 
humiliation and possibly termination for failing to meet aggressive and 
unrealistic sales goals, began forging customer signatures, creating fake PINs and 
email addresses, and sending bills from the phony accounts to their own 
addresses so the customers would never find out.3 Employees would then pay for 
the unauthorized products by transferring money from the customers’ other 
accounts, or would harm credit scores by simply letting late fees accrue.4 
This practice continued for at least a decade5 and was designed to boost sales 
figures and increase Wells Fargo’s stock value.6 After the fake accounts 
generated millions in fines for the customers7 and hundreds of millions in gains 
for Wells Fargo,8 the joy ride eventually ended.9 The customers Wells Fargo 
 
2. Consumer Fin. Protections Bureau, Consent Order on Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. at 5, 7 (Sept. 8, 2016) 
[hereinafter Consent Order] (stating the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau found that Wells Fargo 
employees opened 1,534,280 unauthorized deposit accounts and applied for 565,443 unauthorized credit-card 
accounts, a total of 2,099,723 unauthorized bank accounts); James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo May Have 
Created 3.5 Million Unauthorized Accounts—1.4 Million More Than Estimated, Attorneys Say, L.A. TIMES 
(May 12, 2017, 4:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-unauthorized-accounts-20170512-story.html 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing recent estimates put that number closer to 3.5 
million, based on “public information, negotiations, and confirmatory discovery,” however “[t]he filing cautions 
that the 3.5 million figure could be an overestimate, though a reasonable one.”). 
3. E. Scott Reckard, Wells Fargo’s Pressure-Cooker Sales Culture Comes at a Cost, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 
21, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-sale-pressure-20131222-story.html (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
4. James F. Peltz, Wells Fargo’s Collateral Damage: Customers’ Credit Scores, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23, 
2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-credit-scores-20160923-snap-story.html 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also Editorial, The Wells Fargo Spillover Effect, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/opinion/the-wells-fargo-spillover-
effect.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that while the actual effect on credit 
scores is “difficult to measure,” analysts from Goldman Sachs Group Inc. estimated that “if all the Wells Fargo 
customers with unwanted credit cards then applied for mortgages, they potentially faced $50 million in higher 
interest expenses overall.”). 
5. Stacy Cowley, At Wells Fargo, Complaints About Fraudulent Accounts Since 2005, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/business/dealbook/at-wells-fargo-complaints-about-
fraudulent-accounts-since-2005.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
6. See Consent Order, supra note 2, at 4; see also Jena McGregor, ‘You Should Resign’: Elizabeth 
Warren Excoriates Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/on-leadership/wp/2016/09/20/you-should-resign-elizabeth-warren-excoriates-wells-fargo-ceo-john-
stumpf/?utm_term=.989d7964f8b4 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (questioning former 
Wells Fargo CEO John Strumpf at a Senate hearing, Senator Elizabeth Warren stated: “While this scam was 
going on, you personally held an average of 6.75 million shares of Wells Fargo stock …. The share price during 
this time went up by about $30, which comes out to more than $200 million in gains, all for you personally.”). 
7. Consent Order, supra note 2, at 5, 7 (finding that roughly 85,000 of the unauthorized deposit accounts 
incurred around $2 million in fees, while roughly 14,000 of the unauthorized credit-card accounts generated 
$403,145: Wells Fargo is in the process of refunding these fees). 
8. McGregor, supra note 6. 
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defrauded, however, never got to face the bank giant in court.10 By enforcing the 
arbitration clauses in the fine print of its contracts and sending all its customers’ 
claims to private arbitration, Wells Fargo was able to ward off any public 
courtroom scrutiny.11 
Chapter 480 is a direct response to this use of compelled arbitration to avoid 
answering to juries in a public court of law,12 a tactic the senator who introduced 
Chapter 480 called “un-American.”13 Chapter 480 supporters—mainly consumer 
advocate groups14—hope the threat of public litigation will deter financial 
institutions from committing similar acts of fraud in the future,15 and address the 
“growing breakdown of integrity in the culture of too many of our financial 
institutions.”16 The opposition—notably banks, insurance companies, and 
chambers of commerce17—have called Chapter 480 a “job killer,”18 and believe 
the Federal Arbitration Act preempts it.19 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Arbitration clauses are frequently found in the fine print of consumer 
contracts—people who own cell phones, use credit cards, or have student loans20 
are exceedingly likely to be subject to one, often without even knowing it.21 
 
9. Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Accounts, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-years-of-harm-
to-customers.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
10. Michael Hiltzik, How Wells Fargo Exploited a Binding Arbitration Clause to Deflect Customers’ 
Fraud Allegations, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016, 11:55 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-
hiltzik-wells-arbitration-20160926-snap-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
11. James Rufus Koren, Even in Fraud Cases, Wells Fargo Customers are Locked into Arbitration, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-arbitration-20151205-story.html (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
12. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 33, at 1 (Apr. 24, 2017). 
13. Treasurer Chiang, Sen. Dodd Act to Stop Banks from Using Forced Arbitration to Settle Fraud 
Accusations, California State Treasurer John Chiang (May 2, 2017), http://www.sto.ca.gov/news/releases/2017/ 
20170502/23.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
14. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 33, at 7 (Apr. 24, 2017). 
15. Id. at 4–5. 
16. Treasurer Chiang, supra note 12. 
17. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 33, at 7–8 (Apr. 24, 2017). 
18. Jennifer Barrera, CalChamber-Opposed Job Killer Bill Discriminates Against Arbitration, 
CALCHAMBER (Jan. 17, 2017), https://advocacy.calchamber.com/2017/01/17/calchamber-opposed-job-killer-
bill-discriminates-against-arbitration/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
19. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 33, at 6 (Apr. 24, 2017). 
20. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a) at 7 (Mar. 2015) [hereinafter ARBITRATION STUDY] 
available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
21. Id. § 1 at 11 (“Consumers are generally unaware of whether their credit card contracts include 
arbitration clauses. Consumers with such clauses in their agreements generally either do not know whether they 
 
 
2018 / Civil 
380 
Parties subject to an arbitration clause may enforce it by asking a court to send 
both parties to arbitration if an issue arises between them.22 An alternative to 
courtroom litigation, arbitration resolves disputes informally before arbitrators, 
instead of judges or juries.23 Arbitration proceedings are private and may be kept 
confidential, and attorneys play a much more limited role.24 Unlike the scope of 
judicial review that has a relatively low threshold for appealing a judgment, the 
scope of review for arbitration awards is “extraordinarily narrow.”25 For many, 
this informality makes arbitration preferable to the court system, which uses 
formalistic procedures and is notoriously slow.26 Still, while arbitration may be 
significantly faster,27 its informality and the risk of arbitrator bias causes many to 
oppose its grip over parties who would otherwise never agree to its terms.28 
Further, the rise of forced arbitration in disputes between corporations and 
consumers raises constitutional issues by depriving millions of Americans of 
their Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury.29 
Part A explains the federal law that provides the legal basis for enforcing 
arbitration.30 Part B discusses practical impacts of widespread arbitration use in 
 
can sue in court or wrongly believe that they can do so.”). 
22. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (West 2016).  
23. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc, 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956). 
24. A.B.A., BENEFITS OF ARBITRATION FOR COMMERCIAL DISPUTES at 3, available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/dispute_resolution/committees/arbitration/arbitrationguid
e.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited July 3, 2017) [hereinafter A.B.A.] (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (“Many hearing related matters which consume time and money in court are usually not part of 
arbitration such as extensive evidentiary issues, voir dire, jury charges, proposed findings of fact, endless 
authentication of documents, qualification of experts, and cumulative witnesses. Finally post hearing appeals 
and court proceedings are far more limited in arbitration than in court.”). 
25. Antwine v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1990). 
26. See A.B.A., supra note 24, at 3 (noting how, in 2011, the median amount of time it takes after filing a 
civil case in district court to reach disposition of appeal was 30.8 months, while the average time from starting 
arbitration proceedings to issuing a final award was around 7 months).  
27. Id. 
28. Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985, 1026 (2012). See 
Omri Ben-Shara, The Paradox of Access Justice, and Its Application to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1755, 1796 (2016) (citing as some of the more “frequently voiced concerns” over arbitration as being: “the 
lack of effective choice by consumers regarding binding arbitration, concerns about bias …, arbitration-related 
costs…, the opacity and difficulty of challenging arbitration awards, and the lack of information regarding the 
performance of arbitration systems.”); see also Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and 
the Demise of Separability, 56 S.M.U. L. REV. 819, 823 (2003) (explaining how the problem of power 
imbalances and lack of substantive judicial review in arbitration is “exacerbated by the fact that arbitrators, 
unlike judges, have economic incentives with respect to their case loads that can affect their judgment in 
individual cases.”). 
29. Norman W. Spaulding, Due Process Without Judicial Process, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2249, 2250 
(2017) (“Some scholars view the disappearance of jury trials in civil cases as a Seventh Amendment crisis, the 
product of a gradual but systematic and unconstitutional redistribution of decision-making authority from juries 
to judges over the last 175 years.”). 
30. See infra Part II.A. 
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the financial industry, nonjudicial efforts to narrow the federal law, and 
California’s arbitration law amended by Chapter 480.31 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act 
Subpart 1 examines the Supreme Court’s broadening of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) over the past several decades.32 Subpart 2 describes the 
FAA’s recent developments and current status.33 Subpart 3 explains the FAA’s 
preemptive authority over conflicting state law.34 
The FAA35 makes arbitration clauses contained in maritime and commercial 
contracts “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”36 The Act was designed to 
place contracts with arbitration clauses “on the same footing as other contracts”37 
in response to how hostile courts were toward compelling arbitration.38 
1. Supreme Court Broadens the FAA’s Scope 
After the FAA was enacted, courts treated the law as a matter of procedure 
for application in federal diversity cases.39 Thus, based on the requirement that 
federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law,40 if a court decided 
 
31. See infra Part II.B. 
32. See infra Part II.A.1. 
33. See infra Part II.A.2. 
34. See infra Part II.A.3. 
35. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (West 2016). 
36. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2–4 (establishing two means of enforcing arbitration upon the petition of a party: through 
a stay of any proceedings brought in court until all issues referable to arbitration are decided, or by ordering 
arbitration once “satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is 
not in issue.”). 
37. Dr.’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 
U. S. 506, 511 (1974)). 
38. See Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120–21 (1924) (“[F]ederal courts . . . both in 
equity and at law, denied, in large measure, the aid of their processes to those seeking to enforce executory 
agreements to arbitrate disputes. They have declined to compel specific performance . . . or to stay proceedings 
on the original cause of action.”); see also Danielsen v. Entre Rios R. Co., 22 F.2d 326, 327 (D. Md. 1927) 
(“Prior to the [FAA], the law was well settled that agreements for arbitration would not be allowed to oust the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Therefore no effect was given to them, even though they might be recognized 
as valid.”). 
39. See Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 278 (1932) (declaring the FAA constitutional, the 
Court classified the Act as procedural, stating: “[t]he general power of the Congress to provide remedies in 
matters falling within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, and to regulate their procedure, is 
indisputable.”) (emphasis added); see also In re Woerner, 31 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1929) (holding that the 
FAA, as law applicable in federal courts, did not govern the dispute because there was no diversity of 
citizenship or the sufficient amount in controversy). 
40. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (putting forth the “Erie Doctrine” by holding 
that federal courts in diversity cases must apply state substantive law). 
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to apply the FAA, it would have to carefully ensure it did not infringe substantive 
state rights.41 The Supreme Court decided 31 years later that the FAA was 
actually substantive, not procedural,42 and as such seriously limited its use in 
federal diversity cases for the next several years.43 
In 1967, the Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. 
Co. took a new stance towards arbitration.44 Calling the FAA a legitimate 
exercise of congressional power over commerce, the Court held that it applied in 
federal diversity cases despite being substantive.45 Additionally, it held that 
arbitration clauses were “separable” from their “container contracts.”46 This case 
concerned allegations that the bankrupt Flood & Conklin falsely represented 
itself as solvent to induce Prima Paint to enter into a consulting contract.47 If true, 
Prima Paint may have voided the contract because it was induced by fraud.48 Yet 
this consulting contract contained an arbitration clause, and based on what is now 
referred to as the “separability doctrine,”49 the Court treated the arbitration clause 
as a separate contract, enforced it, and sent Prima Paint’s fraudulent inducement 
 
41. Id. at 79; see also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435, 438 (1953) (choosing to invalidate an 
arbitration clause as applied to an issue arising under the Securities Act, the Court explained: “[e]ven though the 
provisions of the Securities Act, advantageous to the buyer, apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened 
in arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings.”); see also American Almond Prod. Co. v. Consol. Pecan 
Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (1944) Learned Hand explained: 
Arbitration may or may not be a desirable substitute for trials in courts; as to that the parties must 
decide in each instance. But when they have adopted it, they must be content with its informalities; 
they may not hedge it about with those procedural limitations which it is precisely its purpose to 
avoid. They must content themselves with looser approximations to the enforcement of their rights 
than those that the law accords them, when they resort to its machinery. 
Id. 
42. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 199–200 (1956) (applying state law 
after finding that compelling arbitration would make a radical difference in the ultimate result as compared to if 
the Court followed the Vermont state law that allowed for the revocation of arbitration agreements at any time 
prior to a judgment).   
43. See Federal Arbitration Act and Application of the “Separability Doctrine” in Federal Courts, 1968 
DUKE L.J. 588, 588 (1968) (“The classification of arbitration as “substantive” in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic 
Company jeopardized application of the federal Arbitration Act in diversity cases.”). 
44. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (expanding drastically the 
application of the FAA after having been declared substantive by the Bernardt v. Polygraphic Co. Court).  
45. Id. at 405 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924)); S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 
1st Sess., 3 (1924) (“[I]t is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to 
the incontestable federal foundations of control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
46. Id. at 410 (Black, J. dissenting) (using “container contract” to refer to the underlying contract that 
contains, for example, an arbitration clause). 
47. Id. at 398. 
48. Id. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting). 
49. Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 109 (2007) (“This holding is known as the ‘separability’ doctrine because it treats 
the arbitration clause as if it is a separate contract from the contract containing the arbitration clause, that is, the 
container contract.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
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claim to arbitration.50 In doing so, the Court interpreted the FAA’s savings 
clause, which states: “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract,”51 as a means to challenge only the arbitration clause 
itself, rather than the contract as a whole. Revoking a contract on traditional 
grounds (such as fraud) could only be done if fraud was used to induce the 
arbitration clause specifically, rather than the entire contract.52 
The Court doubled down on its new “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration”53 in the 1980s, ruling that the FAA requires “rigorous” enforcement54 
in both state and federal courts.55 This rigorous enforcement meant that any 
doubts as to whether a dispute should fall within the scope of an arbitration 
clause would need to be resolved “in favor of arbitration.”56 That is, a court could 
only refuse to send a claim to arbitration if there was “positive assurance that the 
arbitration clause is not susceptible [to] an interpretation that covers the asserted 
dispute.”57 As a result, a wide array of claims that can arise between parties to a 
contract, even torts,58 usually fit well within the scope of arbitration clauses—
particularly those worded broadly.59 In fact, the only time disputes fall outside 
the scope of a broadly-worded arbitration clause is when the claim could be 
pursued “without referring to the contract or relationship at issue.”60 
  
 
50. Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 409 (Black, J., dissenting). 
51. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (showing the FAA’s “savings clause” follows immediately after the mandate that 
arbitration clauses be “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable”) (emphasis added).  
52. Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404 (“[A] federal court may consider only issues relating to the 
making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate”) (emphasis added). See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. 
Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010) (quoting Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 403–04 (“In 
Prima Paint . . . if the claim had been fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself, then the court 
would have considered it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
53. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
54. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985). 
55. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 16 (1984).  
56. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25. 
57. AT&T Techs. v. Comm. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582–83 (1960)) (emphasis added). 
58. See Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 395 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Even real torts can be covered 
by arbitration clauses [i]f the allegations underlying the claims ‘touch matters’ covered by the [agreement].”). 
59. AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation 
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1960)) (“Such a presumption [favoring coverage of the arbitration provision] is 
particularly applicable where the clause is as broad as the one employed in this case, which provides for 
arbitration of any differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the performance of any 
obligation hereunder.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60. Telecomms. Decision Makers, Inc. v. Access Integrated Networks, Inc., 654 F. App’x 218, 222 (6th 
Cir. 2016) (quoting Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 395 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
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2. Modern FAA 
In 2007, the Court in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna expanded the 
separability doctrine, declaring arbitration clauses separable from not only 
potentially voidable container contracts, but also from those that are void on 
inception.61 Allegations of usurious interest rates would have made Buckeye 
Check Cashing’s contracts illegal and unenforceable by either party.62 The Court 
enforced the contracts’ arbitration clauses anyway, because the FAA’s use of the 
word “contract” “so obviously includes putative contracts.”63 
Four years later, the Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion held that 
California courts could not use the general contractual defense of 
unconscionability64 to invalidate an arbitration clause’s class action waiver.65 In 
finding California’s “Discover Bank rule” preempted by the FAA,66 the majority 
explained: “[c]ontract defenses unrelated to the making of the agreement—such 
as public policy—could not be the basis for declining to enforce an arbitration 
clause,”67 and California’s refusal to enforce class action waivers as 
unconscionable “[stood] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s 
objectives.”68 
3. Preemption 
This apparent FAA conflict sent the Discover Bank rule into a fast-growing 
club of state laws preempted by the FAA.69 Such preemptive authority70 stems 
 
61. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 448 (2006). 
62. Id. at 443. 
63. Id. at 448. 
64. Dean Witter Reynolds v. Super. Ct., 211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 795 (1989) (stating that the 
unconscionability doctrine allows the court to refuse to enforce a contract it deems “unconscionable,” that is, 
one where a party lacks meaningful choice, the provision is “hidden in a prolix printed form” and is “overly 
harsh or one-sided.”). 
65. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011); see Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 
Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1101 (2002) (“[A class action waiver] provides the customer with no benefit whatsoever; to 
the contrary, it seriously jeopardizes customers’ consumer rights by prohibiting any effective means of litigating 
Discover’s business practices. This is not only substantively unconscionable, it violates public policy by 
granting Discover a “get out of jail free” card while compromising important consumer rights.”). 
66. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 334, 351–52 (2011) (explaining the Discover Bank rule as being the holding 
that: “class waivers in consumer arbitration agreements are unconscionable if the agreement is in an adhesion 
contract, disputes between the parties are likely to involve small amounts of damages, and the party with 
inferior bargaining power alleges a deliberate scheme to defraud.”).  
67. Id. at 355–56. 
68. Id. at 355. 
69. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 484, 491 (1987) (preempting § 229 of the California Labor Code 
which allowed for wage collection actions to be brought in court despite being subject to an arbitration 
agreement); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (preempting “§ 31512 of the California 
Franchise Investment Law”); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 506 (4th Cir. 2002) (preempting a 
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from the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause,71 and because the FAA does not 
have express preemption language in its text,72 the Supreme Court has inferred a 
preemptive effect.73 States today cannot pass laws that “interfere with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration,”74 or that “prohibit[] outright the arbitration 
of a particular type of claim.”75 State laws also cannot invalidate arbitration 
clauses unless the law is “generally applicable” to all contracts76—it cannot 
 
West Virginia rule that prevented human rights claims from compelled arbitration); Abela v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 669 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (preempting a Michigan law preventing lemon law claims 
from compelled arbitration). 
70. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).  
Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and is compelled whether Congress’ command is 
explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. Absent 
explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least two types of implied preemption: field 
pre-emption, where the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, and conflict pre-emption, where 
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or where state law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress. 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See Kristen M. Blankley, Impact Preemption, 67 FLA. L. 
REV. 711, 711 (2015) (coining the term “impact preemption” for the FAA, explaining how the Supreme Court 
has made the scope of the FAA’s preemption “broader than even field preemption.”). 
71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (quoting Maryland 
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)) (“[S]tate laws that conflict with federal law are without effect.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
72. Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of LeLand Stan. Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989). 
73. Southland, 465 U.S. at 15–16 (“[S]ince the overwhelming proportion of civil litigation in this country 
is in the state courts, Congress could not have intended to limit the Arbitration Act to disputes subject only to 
federal-court jurisdiction. In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress 
intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements”). This 
inference has been roundly criticized for contradicting the FAA’s clear and unmistakable congressional intent. 
See id. at 23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s decision . . . utterly fails to recognize the clear 
congressional intent underlying the FAA.”); see also id. at 25 (“One rarely finds a legislative history as 
unambiguous as the FAA’s. That history establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a 
procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts, derived, Congress believed, largely from the federal power 
to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts”); see also Brief of Arbitration Scholar Imre S. Szalai As Amicus 
Curiae In Support Of Respondents, Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017) (No. 16–
32) at 13 (“Southland is considered one of the most deeply flawed Supreme Court decisions ever issued 
regarding federalism, due to the broad, unconstitutional intrusion on state sovereignty arising 
from Southland.”); Thomas Burch, Necessity Never Made a Good Bargain, 31 FLA ST. U. L. REV. 1005, 1014 
(2004) (“Southland is perhaps the most controversial case in the Supreme Court’s history of arbitration 
jurisprudence.”). 
74. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344–45 (2011) (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 
U.S. 346, 357–58, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008)) (explaining some “fundamental attributes of arbitration” are 
“ensur[ing] the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined 
proceedings.”). 
75. Id. at 341. 
76. Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (“Courts may not, however, invalidate 
arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.”). 
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“apply only to arbitration” or “derive [its] meaning from the fact that an 
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”77 
This preemptive authority applies even if the state law is a matter of 
important public policy78 or secures vindication of certain rights.79 In fact, two 
years after Concepcion, the Court rejected the argument that prohibiting class 
actions precludes vindication of important rights because there is “no economic 
incentive to pursue [claims] individually in arbitration.”80 The American Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant decision81 dealt with the “effective vindication” 
exception set out by the Supreme Court in 1984, whereby arbitration agreements 
that acted as prospective waivers of statutory rights were recognized as against 
public policy.82 Disregarding the economic realities of litigation, the Italian 
Colors majority stated: “[T]he fact that it is not worth the expense involved in 
proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to 
pursue that remedy.”83 
B. Practical Impacts and California’s Arbitration Law 
Through this fervent judicial sponsorship, arbitration agreements have 
increased in prominence,84 limiting the ability of states to create or enforce laws 
addressing the potentially negative effects of reading the FAA so broadly.85  
Subpart 1 elaborates on how the current state of the law has allowed Wells Fargo 
to successfully enforce its arbitration clauses against its defrauded customers.86 
Subpart 2 describes efforts to curb unfairness incident to the rigorous 
enforcement of arbitration clauses.87 Subpart 3 gives a brief overview of 
California’s Arbitration Act.88 
 
77. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017). 
78. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 355 (“Contract defenses unrelated to the making of the agreement—such as 
public policy—could not be the basis for declining to enforce an arbitration clause.”). 
79. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013). 
80. Id. at 2310. 
81. Id. at 2310–12. 
82. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 637 n.19 (1984) (noting 
there would be “little hesitation in condemning [a clause that acted as a prospective waiver of the right to pursue 
statutory remedies for antitrust violations] as against public policy.”). 
83. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2311. 
84. Scott Atlas & Nancy Atlas, Potential ADR Backlash, 10 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 14, 15 (2004) (noting the 
American Arbitration Association reported a growth in arbitrations from less than 61,000 in 1990, to over than 
230,000 in 2002). 
85. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 394 n.2 (2004) 
(providing a sampling of preempted state laws). 
86. See infra Part II.B.1. 
87. See infra Part II.B.2. 
88. See infra Part II.B.3. 
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1. Wells Fargo Cashes in its Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card89 
Because arbitration clauses are rigorously enforced, Wells Fargo has 
managed to stay out of the courtroom and avoid facing the consequences of its 
multi-year scam.90 When defrauded customers tried suing, the bank prevented 
their claims from reaching a courtroom by enforcing the arbitration clauses from 
the original contracts the customers signed,91 each containing class action 
waivers and agreements to arbitrate all disputes.92 In fact, “dispute” was defined 
as “any unresolved disagreement between you and the Bank,” including “any 
disagreement relating in any way to services, accounts or matters . . . broken 
promises or contracts, torts, or other wrongful actions . . . statutory, common law, 
and equitable claims.”93 Such broad clauses meant that even if a judge had doubts 
as to whether identity theft and fraud ought to fall within their scope, those 
doubts were to be resolved “in favor of arbitration.”94 
2. Nonjudicial Attempts at Narrowing the FAA 
Recognizing that the judiciary’s infatuation with arbitration entailed 
unfairness in certain contexts, the other two branches of government have 
attempted to limit the FAA’s broad reach.95 In 2002, the Motor Vehicle Franchise 
Contract Arbitration Fairness Act required that pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
between motor vehicle dealers and manufacturers have both parties’ consent 
before becoming enforceable.96 Passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 barred 
the use of arbitration clauses in mortgage contracts97 and enforcing such clauses 
against whistleblowers.98 President Barack Obama’s Fair Pay and Safe 
 
89. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1101 (2002) (stating that class action waivers in 
particular have been called “get out of jail free cards,” because they “[prohibit] any effective means of litigating 
[a corporation’s] business practices.”). 
90. See Order Granting Defendant’s Motions to Compel Arbitration, Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 
15-cv-02159-VC (N.D. Cal. 2015) No. 58, 59 at 3 (granting motion to compel arbitration over disputes 
concerning the illegal use of personal identifying information to open fake accounts). 
91. Id.  
92. Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff Kaylee Heffelfinger’s Claims at 3, Jabbari v. Wells Fargo 
& Co. (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 15-cv-02159-VC).  
93. Id. (emphasis added). 
94. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983). 
95. Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, Senate Bill 1140, 107th Cong. (2001); 
Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, Senate Bill 1140, 107th Cong. (2001); Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010, H.R. 4173 § 922(b) (codified as 18 U.S.C. 1514A(e)) (West 2015); Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 
Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2016). 
96. Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, Senate Bill 1140, 107th Cong. (2001) 
(providing “greater fairness in the arbitration process relating to motor vehicle franchise contracts”). 
97. Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, H.R. 4173 § 1414(e) (codified as 15 U.S.C. 1639c(e)) (West 2015). 
98. Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, H.R. 4173 § 922(b) (codified as 18 U.S.C. 1514A(e)) (West 2015). 
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Workplaces Executive Order of 2014 barred employers from forcing arbitration 
of workers’ sexual harassment, sexual assault, and workplace discrimination 
claims.99 Recent attempts have been unsuccessful, however,100 including the 
Justice for Victims of Fraud Act of 2016, which would have invalidated pre-
dispute arbitration agreements related to unrequested credit cards.101 Indeed, the 
trend of scaling back the FAA’s expanse appears to have halted—a bill 
introduced in the Senate that would allow courts to invalidate arbitration clauses 
as unconscionable102 has a 1% chance of enactment.103 Furthermore, a rule by the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) banning pre-dispute class action 
waivers in arbitration clauses between financial providers and consumers104 was 
instantly attacked by a swarm of banks,105 and eventually repealed by Congress106 
with the Trump administration’s blessing.107 
3. California’s Arbitration Act 
Tracking closely to the FAA, Civil Code Section 1281.2 of the California 
Arbitration Act (CAA)108 provided three exceptions to the court’s obligation to 
 
99. Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 at 45314 (July 31, 2016). 
100. The following bills did not end up passing: Fair Contracts for Growers Act of 2007, Senate Bill 221, 
110th Cong. (2007) (“A bill . . . to provide for greater fairness in the arbitration process relating to livestock and 
poultry contracts.”); Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, H.R. 6126, 110th Cong. (2008) (making pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in long-term care facilities, such as nursing homes, unenforceable). 
101. Justice for Victims of Fraud Act of 2016, Senate Bill 3491, 114th Cong. (2016) (amending “the 
Truth in Lending Act and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to provide justice to victims of fraud.”). 
102. Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act, S. 550, 115th Cong. (2017) (amending 9 
U.S.C. § 2) (amending the FAA’s savings clause—“save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract”—to include: “a Federal or State statute, or the finding of a Federal or State court, 
that prohibits the agreement to arbitrate on grounds that the agreement is unconscionable, invalid because there 
was no meeting of the minds, or otherwise unenforceable as a matter of contract law or public policy.”). 
103. S. 550: Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act of 2017, GOVTRACK (last visited 
June 15, 2017), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s550 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
104. BUREAU OF CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION, ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, 12 C.F.R. PT. 1040(a)(1) 
(July 19, 2017), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-07-19/pdf/2017-14225.pdf (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
105. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, TRADE LETTER ON ARBITRATION (2017), available at http ://www.aba. 
com/Advocacy/Grassroots/WINNDocs/TradeLetteronArbitrationCRA.pdf (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
106. Goodwin, CFPB’s Arbitration Rule Dies at Hands of Senate and President, JDSUPRA (Nov. 20, 
2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cfpb-s-arbitration-rule-dies-at-hands-82054/ (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
107. H.J. Res. 111 – Disapproving the Rule, Submitted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
Known as the Arbitration Agreements Rule, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 24, 2017), https://www.whitehouse. 
gov/the-press-office/2017/07/24/hj-res-111-disapproving-rule-submitted-consumer-financial-protection (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The Administration strongly supports House passage of H.J. 
Res. 111.”). 
108. California Arbitration Act (CAA), CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1294.2 (West 2017). 
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enforce arbitration clauses.109 A court would not grant a party’s motion to compel 
arbitration if: (1) the right to compel has been waived; (2) the agreement is 
revocable; or (3) a party “is also a party to a pending court action or special 
proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of 
related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common 
issue of law or fact.”110 
III. CHAPTER 480 
Chapter 480 amended Civil Code Section 1281.2 by adding a fourth 
exception to the court’s obligation to enforce valid arbitration agreements.111 This 
exception applies only where a financial institution petitions a court to compel 
arbitration against an unwilling party asserting claims of fraud and identity 
theft.112 Specifically, it bars a “state or federally chartered depository institution” 
from enforcing any arbitration clause contained in its original banking contracts 
to accounts that were created “fraudulently without the respondent consumer’s 
consent and by unlawfully using the respondent consumer’s personal identifying 
information.”113 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Chapter 480 is a direct response (and perhaps a knee-jerk reaction) to Wells 
Fargo’s use of forced arbitration following its mass-defrauding scam.114 While 
clearly necessary to address a real problem, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the FAA so broadly that even the slightest whiff of “anti-arbitration” subjects 
state laws to preemption.115 Part A discusses the virtue of Chapter 480, namely 
why its implementation is necessary to provide consumers better recourse against 
financial institutions than individual arbitration can.116 Part B addresses its vice: 
preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act.117 
 
109. Id. at § 1281.2. 
110. Id. This third exception was able to survive a Supreme Court preemption attack back in 1989 in Volt 
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of LeLand Stanford Junior University, since the Court found the 
law would not “undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.” Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of LeLand Stan. 
Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). 
111. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1281.2(d) (amended by Chapter 480). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 33, at 1 (Apr. 24, 2017). 
115. See Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017) (admonishing that 
state laws that “covertly accomplishes the same” as discriminating against the FAA are preempted). 
116. See infra Part IV.A. 
117. See infra Part IV.B. 
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A. The Problems with Forcing Arbitration 
Subpart 1 explains why the prevalence of arbitration clauses in adhesive 
contracts, and banking contracts in particular, generally makes for a questionable 
deprivation of important rights.118 Subpart 2 describes how certain features of 
arbitration are inherently pro-corporation.119 
1. Mass Deprivation of Rights 
The FAA was originally passed to streamline basic disputes between 
merchants of relatively equal bargaining power.120 Today however, the FAA 
applies to adhesion contracts121—which, while constituting a bulk of contracts 
entered into today,122 are in some cases not entirely voluntary. That is, although 
individuals do freely enter into these contracts and are responsible for knowing 
what they sign, the reality is that many still either do not read arbitration clauses 
at all, or do not understand what they are giving up by agreeing to one.123  
Further, even if a customer fully understood the effect of an arbitration clause, 
these clauses are in approximately three-quarters of all bank agreements,124 
leaving few options to walk away.125 Hence, enabling compelled arbitration by 
 
118. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
119. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
120. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial 
Arbitration: Hearing of S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 
4th Sess. 9-10 (1923) (responding to a senator inquiring whether the FAA would apply to take-it-or-leave-it 
contracts, the chairman of the Committee of Commerce Trade and Commercial Law of the American Bar 
Association answered: “I think that ought to be protested against, because it is the primary end of this contract 
that it is a contract between merchants one with another, buying and selling goods.”). 
121. Heaberlin Farms, Inc. v. IGA Ins. Co., 641 N.W. 2d 816, 819 (Iowa 2002) (“The FAA does not 
exclude adhesion contracts.”). 
122. 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 24.27A, at 193 (rev. ed. Supp. 2012) 
(“[T]he bulk of contracts signed in this country are adhesion contracts”). 
123. Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang Liu, Whimsy Little Contracts with 
Unexpected Consequences, MD. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (indicating results from a study by St John’s University 
School of Law, which found that out of an online survey of 668 consumers, less than 9% realized after reading 
an arbitration provision that it waived the right to proceed in court. “The survey results suggest a profound lack 
of understanding about the existence and effect of arbitration agreements among consumers.”). See 
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 20, §1 at 11 (2015), available at http://files.consumerfinance. 
gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (“[c]onsumers are generally unaware of whether their credit card contracts include arbitration 
clauses. Consumers with such clauses in their agreements generally either do not know whether they can sue in 
court or wrongly believe that they can do so.”). 
124. Consumers Want the Right to Resolve Bank Disputes in Court: An Update to the Arbitration 
Findings in 2015 Checks and Balances, at 1–3 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Aug. 17, 2016), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2016/08/consumers-want-the-right-to-resolve-
bank-disputes-in-court (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
125. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 477 (2015) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“The 
proliferation of take-it-or-leave-it agreements mandating arbitration and banning class procedures, and this 
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virtue of standard form, take-it-or-leave-it contracts diverges from the FAA’s 
original purpose of streamlining disputes where bargaining power and 
voluntariness were not at issue.126 
2. Arbitration Favors the Corporation 
Arbitration can be an effective tool for resolving disputes quickly and 
informally; yet when seen in terms of actual outcomes, corporations appear to 
have a far greater chance at success than the average individual would.127 In other 
words, the informality that is considered one of the great touchstones of 
arbitration128 does not always benefit the weaker party.129 For instance, class 
actions—even though they “requir[e] procedural formality”—allow individuals 
with small claims to vindicate their rights more cheaply than pursuing a claim 
individually.130 Yet, because arbitration clauses that prohibit class actions are 
fully enforceable, individuals with small claims may be forced to face 
corporations individually in arbitration131 for causing widespread damage to  
customers, albeit for individually small dollar amounts.  
Corporations gain an even greater advantage in the arbitration process since 
they tend to be repeat players in the arbitration process, or with individual 
 
Court’s readiness to enforce such one-sided agreements, have disabled consumers from shop[ping] to avoid 
arbitration mandates.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
126. See id. at 477–78 (“Congress in 1925 could not have anticipated that the Court would apply the 
FAA to render consumer adhesion contracts invulnerable to attack by parties who never meaningfully agreed to 
arbitration in the first place.”); see also Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 
265, 281 (1926). 
[Arbitration] is a remedy peculiarly suited to the disposition of the ordinary disputes between 
merchants as to questions of fact—quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance with terms of 
payment, excuses for non-performance, and the like. It has a place also in the determination of the 
simpler questions of law-the questions of law which arise out of these daily relations between 
merchants. 
Id. 
127. See ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 20, §5 at 13–14 (2015) (showing how consumers that file 
against companies in arbitration are awarded 12 cents for every dollar claimed, while companies are awarded 91 
cents, and provided some type of relief 93% of the time).  
128. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011) (calling informality “the principal 
advantage of arbitration”).  
129. NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, LEGIS. UNIT, CONSUMER ATTORNEYS REPORT: 
ARBITRATION CLAUSES ARE EVERYWHERE, CONSEQUENTLY CAUSING CONSUMER CLAIMS TO DISAPPEAR at 5 
(2012) [hereinafter CONSUMER ATTORNEY REPORT], available at http://www.consumeradvocates.org/ 
sites/default/ files/NACA2012BMASurveyFinalRedacted.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (“The overwhelming majority of consumer attorneys responded that arbitration was wholly 
disadvantageous to the consumer, with specific problems identified as: an uneven playing field, limited recourse 
for the consumer, questionable objectivity of the arbitrator and lack of transparency in the arbitration process.”). 
 130. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 349. 
 131. Id. 
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arbitrators themselves.132 Since repeat players may be a consistent source of 
income for an arbitrator whose “compensation corresponds to the volume of 
arbitration they perform,”133 there may be an incentive to rule in a corporation’s 
favor in hopes of being selected to arbitrate that corporation’s future disputes. 
This risk is particularly pronounced given the fact that the reasons for granting an 
arbitration award need not be disclosed.134 
The privacy and confidentiality135 of arbitration proceedings is yet another 
corporate advantage.136 Corporations benefit from keeping duplicitous business 
practices out of the public eye, while individuals are eventually harmed by those 
practices continuing unchecked by public scrutiny.137 To be sure, Wells Fargo’s 
ability to continue its scam for so many years is attributed to the public being 
 
132. David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After The Revolution: An Empirical Study of 
Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 63 (2015) (“Our multivariate regression analyses demonstrate that 
these elite corporations outperform their one-shot counterparts on win rates and damage payments.”); see also 
Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 195 
(1997) Explaining certain advantages for repeat players, such as: 
(1) experience leading to changes in how the repeat player structures the next similar transaction; (2) 
expertise, economies of scale, and access to specialist advocates; (3) informal continuing 
relationships with institutional incumbents; (4) bargaining reputation and credibility; (5) long-term 
strategies facilitating risk-taking in appropriate cases; (6) influencing rules through lobbying and 
other use of resources; (7) playing for precedent and favorable future rules; (8) (8) distinguishing 
between symbolic and actual defeats; and (9) investing resources in getting rules favorable to them 
implemented.  
Id. See also Bingham, supra note 132, at 220 (1997) (describing the disadvantages for “one-shotters,” on the 
other hand, as being that one-shotters: “(1) have more at stake in a given case; (2) are more risk averse; (3) are 
more interested in immediate over longterm gain; (4) are less interested in precedent and favorable rules; (5) are 
not able to form continuing relationships with courts or institutional representatives; (6) cannot use the 
experience to structure future similar transactions; and (7) have limited access to specialist advocates.”).  
133. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 416 (1967) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (“The only advantage of submitting the issue of fraud to arbitration is for the arbitrators. Their 
compensation corresponds to the volume of arbitration they perform. If they determine that a contract is void 
because of fraud, there is nothing further for them to arbitrate. I think it raises serious questions of due process 
to submit to an arbitrator an issue which will determine his compensation.”). 
134. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 199 (1956) (“Arbitrators . . . need not 
give their reasons for their results.”).  
135. A.B.A., supra note 24, at 5. 
136. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2003), after stating that “confidentiality 
provisions usually favor companies over individuals,” the Ninth Circuit explained: 
if the company succeeds in imposing a gag order, plaintiffs are unable to mitigate the advantages 
inherent in being a repeat player. This is particularly harmful here, because the contract at issue 
affects seven million Californians. Thus, AT&T has placed itself in a far superior legal posture by 
ensuring that none of its potential opponents have access to precedent while, at the same time, 
AT&T accumulates a wealth of knowledge on how to negotiate the terms of its own unilaterally 
crafted contract.  
Id.  
137. Id. (explaining further why it found a confidentiality provision unconscionable, the court noted that 
“the unavailability of arbitral decisions may prevent potential plaintiffs from obtaining the information needed 
to build a case of intentional misconduct or unlawful discrimination against AT&T.”).  
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none the wiser, since those willing to challenge the bank could only proceed in 
private arbitration.138 
Simply put, it makes impeccable business sense for any corporation, 
including banks, to rely on arbitration agreements that the customer often 
overlooks.139 Accordingly, Wells Fargo is not unique in taking advantage of such 
broad FAA interpretation to ruthlessly enforce arbitration clauses against its 
customers, even those victimized by deceptive and illegal business practices.140 If 
objectively fewer claims are raised,141 those that are raised are less likely to 
succeed, and the threat of public court proceedings is off the table, then the 
profits to be earned from cheating customers out of small sums of money winds 
up justifying the risk. 
Efforts by members of Congress142 and government agencies143 demonstrate 
an acute awareness of and desire to fix this problem. In particular, the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau’s final rule banning class action waivers in contracts 
between financial institutions and customers responded to the same problem 
triggering Chapter 480.144 However, a republican Congress swiftly repealed this 
rule under the Congressional Review Act,145 making state efforts like Chapter 
480 all the more crucial. 
 
138. See Michael Corkery & Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Killing Sham Account Suits by Using 
Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/ business/dealbook/wells-fargo-
killing-sham-account-suits-by-using-arbitration.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(“Wells Fargo has been moving disputes about unauthorized accounts into arbitration for years, which lawyers 
say may have helped keep the problems from bursting into public view sooner.”). 
139. See ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 20, §1 at 11 (“[c]onsumers are generally unaware of whether 
their credit card contracts include arbitration clauses. Consumers with such clauses in their agreements 
generally either do not know whether they can sue in court or wrongly believe that they can do so.”). 
140. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S. Ct. 1204, 1205 (2006) (Pay day lender 
compelled arbitration of allegations it charged usurious interest rates in violation of various state consumer 
protection laws); see also Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013) (American 
Express compelled arbitration and enforced class action ban for claims it violated anti-trust laws to charge rates 
30% higher than competitors); and see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) 
(AT&T compelled arbitration and prevented the formation of a class action alleging AT&T committed fraud 
and engaged in false advertising). 
141. CONSUMER ATTORNEY REPORT, supra note 129. 
142. See supra note 95. 
143. BUREAU OF CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION, ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, 12 C.F.R. PT. 1040 (July 
19, 2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-07-19/pdf/2017-14225.pdf (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
144. Id. (identifying the rule’s purpose as the furtherance of “protection of consumers regarding the use of 
agreements for consumer financial products and services providing for arbitration of any future dispute.”). 
145. A JOINT RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL UNDER CHAPTER 8 OF TITLE 
5, UNITED STATES, Senate J. Res. 47, 115th Congress (2017), https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/sjres47/ 
BILLS-115sjres47is.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Goodwin, CFPB’s Arbitration 
Rule Dies at Hands of Senate and President, JDSUPRA (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/ 
legalnews/cfpb-s-arbitration-rule-dies-at-hands-82054/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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B. Preemption 
With so many unknowingly consenting to limiting their recourse against 
corporations, Chapter 480  is a noble attempt at re-balancing the scales of equity, 
at least when it comes to the relationships between banks and their customer.146 
Yet, good intentions and a worthy cause do little to address FAA preemption.147 
Judicial acrobatics has elevated the FAA to a place of broad preemptive 
authority,148 despite all indications of original legislative intent envisioning quite 
the opposite.149 Regardless, the FAA’s expanse preempts those state laws that are 
anti-arbitration; i.e., those applicable to arbitration clauses in particular, and not 
contracts generally.150 The FAA also preempts state laws that “invalidate 
arbitration agreements,” or conflict with the FAA’s objectives, such as 
“ensur[ing] the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so 
as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”151 
Subpart 1 drives the first nail in the coffin of preemption by detailing the 
conflict between Chapter 480 and the FAA.152 Subpart 2 explains how Chapter 
480’s narrowing of the scope of arbitrable disputes limits the validity of 
otherwise valid arbitration agreements.153 Subpart 3 discusses whether such a 
narrow law could substantially defy the FAA’s objectives.154 
 
146. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 33, at 1 (Apr. 24, 2017). 
147. See Jennifer Barrera, Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary Hearing of 05-02-2017, DIGITAL 
DEMOCRACY (May 2, 2017), https://ca.digitaldemocracy.org/hearing/52532?startTime=957&vid=20fc71 
600cb56ec21205f4e404f836de (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (expressing, in 
opposition to SB 33, that the bill “is going to be challenged under the Federal Arbitration Act, and would likely 
be preempted.”). 
148. E. Gary Spitko, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption of State Public-Policy Based Employment 
Arbitration Doctrine: An Autopsy and an Argument for Federal Agency Oversight, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 
3 (2015) (explaining how FAA jurisprudence is “increasingly preemptive of state efforts to regulate 
arbitration.”). 
149. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 422 (1967) (citing Committee on 
Commerce, Trade & Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A. B. A. J. 
153, 279) (explaining how arbitration under the FAA “is simply a new procedural remedy”); see also id. at 419 
n. 23 (1967) (citing Committee on Commerce, Trade & Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law 
and Its Application, 11 A. B. A. J. 153, 155-56): 
Nor can it be said that the Congress of the United States, directing its own courts . . . , would infringe 
upon the provinces or prerogatives of the States . . . [T]he question of the enforcement relates to the 
law of remedies and not to substantive law. The rule must be changed for the jurisdiction in which 
the agreement is sought to be enforced . . . There is no disposition therefore by means of the Federal 
bludgeon to force an individual State into an unwilling submission to arbitration enforcement. 
Id.  
150. Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (“Courts may not, however, invalidate 
arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.”). 
151. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1743, 1748 (2011). 
152. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
153. See infra Part IV.B.2.  
154. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
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1. Chapter 480 Does Not Apply to Contracts Generally 
At first blush, the unavoidable conclusion is that Chapter 480 cannot avoid 
preemption; most glaringly, Chapter 480 does not apply to contracts generally, 
but instead “deriv[es] [its] meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is 
at issue.”155 Without an arbitration clause, Chapter 480 would simply have no 
purpose; it can only apply where a financial institution seeks “to apply a written 
agreement to arbitrate.”156 
Those in support of Chapter 480 do not consider this fatal, and instead argue 
that the law survives preemption since it is applicable to subsequent contractual 
relationships (fake bank accounts) fraudulently procured.157 Specifically, Chapter 
480’s supporters assert that “a contract entered into fraudulently is void and any 
provision contained in it is void, including an arbitration provision.”158 While this 
understanding seems like common sense, it fails to take into account today’s not-
so-common sense separability doctrine.159 Post-Prima Paint, arbitration clauses 
in potentially voidable contracts (e.g., those induced by fraud) were separate 
from the contract itself, meaning a contract’s potential voidability did not affect 
the enforceability of an arbitration clause contained therein.160 Further, post-
Buckeye, arbitration clauses in potentially void contracts (e.g., illegal contracts) 
were also declared separable and enforceable.161 So, defenses like fraud could 
only keep Wells Fargo customers from forced arbitration if the bank fraudulently 
induced the arbitration clauses in particular, but not the whole contract.162 
Because Chapter 480 does not require fraud or illegality to specifically pertain to 
an arbitration clause, it falls outside the purview of the FAA’s savings clause, 
 
155. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1423 (2017). 
156. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (amended by Chapter 480). 
157. Email from Les Spahn, Legislative Director, to Bill Dodd, Senator, Cal. State Senate (arguing that 
SB 33 is not preempted by Federal Law) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
158. Id. 
159. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (declaring that 
arbitration agreements are separable from their container contracts). 
160. Id. 
161. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 448 (2006). 
162. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404 (“A federal court may consider only issues relating to the 
making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.”). To be sure, commentators have sharply criticized the 
separability doctrine. See id. at 423 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). 
The separability rule which the Court applies to an arbitration clause does not result in equality 
between it and other clauses in the contract. I had always thought that a person who attacks a 
contract on the ground of fraud and seeks to rescind it has to seek rescission of the whole, not tidbits, 
and is not given the option of denying the existence of some clauses and affirming the existence of 
others. 
Id. See also Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 131-32 
(1996) (calling the separability doctrine “simply ludicrous” and a “legal fiction”); Richard C. Reuben, First 
Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability, 56 S.M.U. L. REV. 819, 880 (2003) (calling 
separability “no longer necessary or appropriate”). 
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which specifically includes only defenses challenging the validity of the 
arbitration clause.163 Consequently, the fact that Chapter 480 is not generally 
applicable to all contracts164 leaves it open to preemption, and the FAA’s savings 
clause simply does not apply.  
2. Chapter 480 Limits the Validity of Arbitration Clauses 
Because fraud and illegality defenses can only affect enforceability if they 
aim directly at the arbitration clause, Chapter 480 would invalidate arbitration 
clauses that were otherwise valid under the FAA,165 thereby conflicting with the 
FAA’s mandate that arbitration clauses be “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable.”166 
Although it may be said that Chapter 480, by invalidating arbitration clauses 
for only specific claims, does not directly conflict with the FAA because the 
clauses would still be “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,” only narrower in 
scope.167 Yet the scope of arbitrable issues is to be resolved in favor of 
arbitration, especially where the provision is broad.168 And it cannot be said with 
“positive assurance”169 that identity theft and fraud fall outside the scope of “any 
unresolved disagreement between [the customer] and the Bank,” including “any 
disagreement relating in any way to services, accounts or matters . . . torts, or 
other wrongful actions . . . statutory, common law, and equitable claims.”170 
Additionally, the sort of claim contemplated by Chapter 480 (unlawful use of 
personal identifying information to create fraudulent accounts) cannot be brought 
 
163. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (West 2016) (“save upon such grounds that 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”); see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. 
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (holding that the defenses referred to in the FAA’s savings clause must be 
directed at the arbitration clause and not the contract in general). 
  164. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (amended by Chapter 480). 
165. Id. 
166. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (West 2016). 
167. Id. 
168. AT&T Tech. v. Comm. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1960)). 
Such a presumption [favoring coverage of the arbitration provision] is particularly applicable where 
the clause is as broad as the one employed in this case, which provides for arbitration of any 
differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the performance of any 
obligation hereunder . . . In such cases, [absent] any express provision excluding a particular 
grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the 
claim from arbitration can prevail. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
169. AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation 
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582–83 (1960)) (emphasis added). 
170. Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff Kaylee Heffelfinger’s Claims at 3, Jabbari v. Wells Fargo 
& Co. (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 15-cv-02159-VC).  
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without referring to the original contract containing the valid arbitration clause.171  
Indeed, the personal identifying information could only be misused by virtue of 
the legitimate banking account with the consumer.172 Thus, it would seem 
entirely consistent with FAA jurisprudence to determine that customers 
victimized by the Wells Fargo scam all have claims falling within the scope of 
their original contracts’ broad arbitration clauses.173 
This being the case, the argument also advanced by Chapter 480’s supporters 
that, “if you don’t have meeting of the minds, you can’t have a contract,” fails as 
well.174 While a correct assertion by itself, the nonexistence of any additional 
contract being formed without customer consent is irrelevant to whether Chapter 
480 conflicts with the FAA.175 The problem Chapter 480 seeks to address is 
financial institutions applying arbitration clauses from contracts (that were 
validly entered into) in order to prevent customers from suing over subsequent 
fake accounts.176 But if those arbitration clauses covered “any disagreement 
between you and the bank,” then regardless of the illegality, fraudulence, or 
nonexistence of any subsequent contract, disputes over unconsented-to accounts 
fit within that scope.177 
3. Chapter 480 May Go Against the FAA’s Objectives 
Chapter 480, in narrowing the scope of broad arbitration clauses like Wells 
Fargo’s, would invalidate those clauses as to certain claims that otherwise would 
be and have been held to encompass the dispute.178 Additionally, by turning “any 
unresolved disagreement between you and the bank”179 into “any unresolved 
disagreement except for fraud and identity theft,” Chapter 480 interferes with 
 
171. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (amended by Chapter 480). 
172. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 33, at 6 (Apr. 24, 2017). 
173. Order Granting Defendant’s Motions to Compel Arbitration, Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 15-
cv-02159-VC (N.D. Cal. 2015) No. 58, 59 at 3. 
174. Brian Cabateck, Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary Hearing of 05-02-2017, DIGITAL 
DEMOCRACY (May 2, 2017), available at https://ca.digitaldemocracy.org/hearing/52532?StartTime= 
957&vid=20fc71600cb56ec21205f4e404f836de (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
175. Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of LeLand Stan. Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (“[a]rbitration 
under the [FAA] is a matter of consent.”). 
176. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (amended by Chapter 480). 
177. Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff Kaylee Heffelfinger's Claims at 3, Jabbari v. Wells Fargo 
& Co., No. 15-cv-02159-VC (N.D. Cal. 2015) No. 50. 
178. See Order Granting Defendant’s Motions to Compel Arbitration, Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 
15-cv-02159-VC (N.D. Cal. 2015) No. 58, 59 at 3 (holding that illegally using consumers’ personal identifying 
information to open fake accounts was within the scope of Wells Fargo’s broad arbitration clauses). 
179. Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff Kaylee Heffelfinger’s Claims at 3, Jabbari v. Wells Fargo 
& Co. (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 15-cv-02159-VC).  
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arbitration’s “principal purpose,” which is enforcing arbitration clauses 
“according to their terms.”180 
Nevertheless, even if there is no room to maintain that Chapter 480 should 
survive preemption based on it being good policy,181 the argument remains that 
such a narrow law simply cannot be said to substantially interfere with the 
FAA’s objectives. While Chapter 480 would specifically undermine the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements, it would do so only in one narrowly 
defined instance.182 Furthermore, Chapter 480 would not “make it trivially easy 
for States to undermine the Act;”183 it has laser-like application and leaves no 
room for unwarranted expansion.184 The court’s determination is limited to 
deciding whether the petitioner qualifies as a “state or federally chartered 
depository institution,”185 and whether it is seeking to apply a valid arbitration 
clause to a relationship that the financial institution created fraudulently, without 
customer consent, through unlawful use of the customer’s identity.186 
It could also be said that Chapter 480 contravenes FAA objectives by 
allowing some to simply allege fraud and identity theft solely to have a court 
deny arbitration, seeing as courts do not decide the merits of claims when 
determining the scope of arbitrable issues.187 While this surely undermines the 
efficiency of arbitration, the burden is trivial.188 A court could simply “remand” 
the claims to arbitration once it is determined the court no longer has 
jurisdiction.189 Chapter 480 could therefore reasonably be regarded as a non-
threat, occupying an insignificant area of the FAA’s massive reach.190 
 
180. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. 
of Tr. of LeLand Stan. Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
181. Id. at 355 (“Contract defenses unrelated to the making of the agreement—such as public policy—
could not be the basis for declining to enforce an arbitration clause.”). 
182. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (amended by Chapter 480) (applying only where the claim is 
for identity theft and fraud against a financial institution). 
183. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2017). 
184. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(d) (amended by Chapter 480) 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. AT&T Techs. v. Comm. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986) (“[I]n deciding whether the 
parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential merits of 
the underlying claims.”).  
188. Cf. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011) (explaining how classwide 
arbitration goes against the “fundamental attributes of arbitration” by “sacrificing arbitration’s informality and 
[making] the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”). 
189. Cf. 28 U.S.C. §1447(c) (directing federal courts to remand claims to state court where there is no 
longer jurisdiction). 
190. PUB. CITIZEN, FORCED ARBITRATION: UNFAIR AND EVERYWHERE at 1 (2009), available at 
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/unfairandeverywhere.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (reporting from a study of the major players in the credit card, banking, cell phone, computer 
manufacturing, internet, auto dealer, and brokerage industries that 75% used mandatory binding arbitration). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
By allowing customers to hold banks accountable in court despite being 
contractually bound to arbitrate, Chapter 480 addresses a symptom of unchecked 
FAA expansion that was typified by Wells Fargo’s decade-long practice of 
robbing its own customers.191 Yet today’s law makes Chapter 480’s ultimate 
preemption almost inevitable.192 Chapter 480 does not apply to contracts 
generally,193 and ultimately makes arbitration provisions invalid as relating to the 
specific grievance of identity theft and fraud.194 In doing so, Chapter 480 would 
go against the “principal purpose of arbitration”—enforcing arbitration clauses 
“according to their terms.”195 
Furthermore, the public policy arguments for Chapter 480 may be just as 
abundant as they are irrelevant.196 A brief survey of the Supreme Court’s ruthless 
application of the FAA suggests that Chapter 480 is all but dead on arrival.197 
Perhaps more troubling is that even though the 1925 Congress may not have 
wanted the FAA to effectively reduce corporate accountability,198 both the 2017 
Congress and President Trump appear to be all in favor of this result.199 In any 
case, unless and until a preemption challenge successfully invalidates Chapter 
480, this law will serve to safeguard consumers’ rights200 in the event that history 
repeats itself with another Wells Fargo-like fiasco.  
 
191. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 33, at 1 (Apr. 24, 2017). 
192. Spitko, supra note 150, at 3 (calling FAA jurisprudence “increasingly preemptive of state efforts to 
regulate arbitration.”). 
193. Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (“[S]tate laws applicable only to 
arbitration provisions” cannot invalidate arbitration clauses). 
194. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(d) (amended by Chapter 480).  
195. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. 
Bd. of Tr. of LeLand Stan. Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
196. Id. at 1755 (“Contract defenses unrelated to the making of the agreement—such as public policy—
could not be the basis for declining to enforce an arbitration clause.”). 
197. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 477-78 (2015) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (referring to 
the Supreme Court’s recent decisions expanding the FAA, Justice Ginsberg stated: “These decisions have 
predictably resulted in the deprivation of consumers' rights to seek redress for losses, and, turning the coin, they 
have insulated powerful economic interests from liability for violations of consumer-protection laws.”). 
198. See id. (“Congress passed the FAA in 1925 as a response to the reluctance of some judges to 
enforce commercial arbitration agreements between merchants with relatively equal bargaining power.”). 
199. See H.J. Res. 111–Disapproving the Rule, Submitted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
Known as the Arbitration Agreements Rule, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 24, 2017), https://www.whitehouse. 
gov/the-press-office/2017/07/24/hj-res-111-disapproving-rule-submitted-consumer-financial-protection (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (approving of H.J. Res. 111”). 
 200. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(d) (amended by Chapter 480). 
